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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of case 
Pursuant to a jury trial on February 4 through 6, 2004, a Judgment was ordered on 
February 24, 2004 on the verdict for the Plaintiffs Katie Alderson and Kelli Alderson against 
Gary Lynn Bonner in the amount of$215,000. 
Subsequently a hearing in this action was held on August 5, 2004, on Defendant's post 
trial motions, and an Amended Judgment was ordered on August 6, 2004, reducing the verdict 
for the Plaintiffs against Defendant Bonner to the amount of$195,000 plus interest from 
February 26, 2004. 
Next, an Appeal was filed in this action with the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho by 
the Defendant and decided by the Supreme Court's Opinion on April 5, 2006. The District 
Court's decision was modified and a Second Amended Judgment was ordered by the District 
Court on May 26, 2006, ordering a verdict for the Plaintiffs against Defendant Bonner in this 
case in the amount of $55,000 plus interest from February 26, 2004. 
No other Judgments in this case have been since May 26, 2006. 
After more than six years from the final Second Amended Judgment was ordered by the 
Court, no actions had been taken by the Plaintiffs against Defendant Gary Lynn Bonner to 
enforce any of the Judgments ordered by the Court in this case. 
Gary Lynn Bonner now comes before this court and alleges that as a matter oflaw he 
should be granted a relief from all the judgments in this case. 
2. Course of proceedings 
May 26, 2006; Final Judgment entered in case CV 2001-4852. 
May 26, 2012; Six years after Final Judgment. 
June 6, 2012; Defendant Gary Lynn Bonner filed a Motion for Relief from Final Judgment in 
case CV 2001-4852. 
July 20, 2012; Third Judicial District Court Judge Thomas J. Ryan filed a Notice oflntent to 
Grant Motion for Relief from Judgment in case CV2001-4852. 
August 9, 2012; Plaintiff's Attorney filed an Objection to Motion for Relief from Final 
judgment. 
August 13, 2012; Defendant Gary Lynn Bonner filed the Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's 
Objection to Motion for Relief from Final Judgment. 
August 14, 2012; Gary Lynn Bonner filed an Affidavit with the Court that he had never filed for 
bankruptcy, in conjunction with his Response to Plaintiff's Objection to Motion for Relief 
from Final Judgment Defendant. 
August 16, 2012; Third Judicial District Court Judge Thomas J. Ryan filed a Notice of Hearing 
scheduled for October 18, 2012. 
October 18, 2012; A Motion Hearing was held in the Third Judicial District Court before Judge 
Thomas J. Ryan. Neither Plaintiffs nor their Attorney were present. 
October 28, 2012; Defendant Bonner sent a letter to the Court, ex parte, requesting a clarification 
of the outcome of the Hearing. 
January 22, 2013; Third Judicial District Court Judge Thomas J. Ryan filed an Order Denying 
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Motion for Relief from Final Judgment in case CV2001-4852. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's Motion by making a 
statutory interpretation inconsistent with settled law in Idaho? 
2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion to modified Idaho Statutes § 11-101, § 11-105, 
§ 10-1110, and § 10-1111 to allow for re-filing a judgment after five years? 
3. Did the District Court's decision to allow for re-filing a judgment after five years make 
Idaho Statutes§ 11-101, § 11-105, § 10-1110, and§ 10-1111, ambiguous? 
4. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by ruling without a supporting basis in law that 
a Judgment could be refilled at any point in the future? 
5. Did the District Court error by not applying I.R.C.P. Rule 60(b) to grant Defendant's 
Motion? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE ORDER 
DENYING THE MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM FINAL JUDGMENT, BECAUSE THE 
COURT MADE A STATUTORY INTERPRETATION INCONSISTENT WITH THE 
CURRENT SETTLED LAW IN IDAHO. 
The District Court's Order on January 22, 2013 denying Bonner's motion for relief from 
final judgment is in error because it sets a new precedent which would allow a judgment lien to 
be reestablished after it expires under Idaho Statutes §11-101, §11-105, §10-1110, and §10-1111, 
and therefore the decision fundamentally renders the previous meaning of these statutes 
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irrelevant. The statutes are quoted in the Order so I will not be redundant and repeat them. 
In the Order the District Court made a ruling in the Order's Conclusion on page 4 that 
allows the Plaintiffs to "re-file a judgment lien which would establish their priority rights as of 
that date". The Court cited the statutes in the Order; however there is nothing in the statutes 
cited by the Court that allows a judgment lien to be re-filed after the five year limitation has 
expired unless it has been renewed prior to the five year limitation. 
The District Court's conclusion is incorrect because in Bach v. Dawson, Docket 38380, 
2012 Opinion No. 2, January 6, 2012, Judge Gutierrez wrote in Discussion part B: "In short, a 
civil judgment--whether or not a lien is actually recorded--will last for five years, at which time 
it expires, unless a party, before that expiration, makes a motion to renew and such motion is 
granted by the court." There is nothing in the Bach Opinion that states that a judgment or lien 
can be re-filed after it expires in five years as the Court's Order being appealed herein prescribes. 
In the Order's conclusion the Court wrote; "While Plaintiffs priority rights are hindered 
by not executing on the judgment or having the lien renewed, the judgment is still outstanding." 
And; "Plaintiff's can re-file a judgment lien which would establish their priority rights as of that 
date." There is nothing in the Idaho Statutes that allows this interpretation of the law. 
According to Judge Gutierrez's opinion in Bach, a party's rights are not just hindered, but they 
expire if the judgment is not executed or renewed within five years. Therefore, to allow a 
judgment to be re-filed at an unspecified time in the future is contrary to Idaho law. 
The District Court has the authority under Rule 60(b) to grant relief from a judgment, 
however the Court does not have the authority to deny relief by broadening the meaning of the 
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statutes governing judgments as they have in the Order. "ft]he courts are not at liberty to say that 
any of the statutory requirements to perfect or continue a lien may be omitted." Groth v. Ness, 65 
N.D. 580,584,260 N.W. 700, 701 (1935). "Where the Legislature has clearly prescribed what 
facts shall be set forth in the statement, the courts have no power to add to or subtract 
therefrom." Id. 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b) states in part: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ..... ( 4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or ( 6) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 
In Bach v. Dawson Judge Gutierrez stated that a judgment expires if not renewed within 
five years. And it follows that a judgment that has expired by law qualifies as reason (4) (5) or 
( 6) under rule 60(b) and gives the District Court the authority to grant relief from that judgment. 
Although the time periods for judgments vary from state to state, the laws governing how 
judgments are renewed or end are settled. "After (ten) vears after the entry of a judgment that has 
not been renewed, or after (twenty) years after the entry of a judgment that has been renewed, the 
judgment must be canceled ofrecord." See Investors Title Ins. Co. v. Herzig, 2011 ND 7, ,r 11, 
793 N.W.2d 371. In Idaho the time periods are different; however the legal interpretation that 
judgments are cancelled of record should be applied because nothing in the Idaho statutes 
precludes it. And again, if a judgment is cancelled then relief from that judgment should be 
granted under IRCP Rule 60(b) (4) (5) or (6). 
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The District Court should have granted Bonner's Motion for Relief from the Final 
Judgment by precedent because other Idaho Courts have granted relief from judgments when the 
time period has expired under the statutes. The District Court erred when it wrote in the 
conclusion of the Order, "There is nothing in the statutes or rules cited by the Defendant that 
affirmatively grants the Court the ability to grant a motion for relief from a valid final 
judgment." In Allen F Grazer v. Gordon A. Jones, Docket No. 38852, Pocatello November 
2012 Term, 2013 Opinion No. 15, January 29, 2013; the District Court granted summary 
judgment because a lien expired and the Appeals Court upheld the ruling, "The District Court 
properly granted Gordon's motion for summary judgment because (1) Grazer's judgment lien 
expired on July 7, 20 l O", V. Analysis, page 5. "We affirm the district court's decision because 
there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Grazer could obtain any relief.", V. 
Analysis A., page 6. In Bonner's case, after more than six years from the date of entry of the 
judgment there are no material facts that the Plaintiffs could obtain relief and therefore Bonner's 
motion should have been granted pursuant to the above decisions. The District Court's decision 
that the judgment lien could be re-filed in the future is in error. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND AUTHORITY 
BECAUSE IT MODIFIED IDAHO STATUTES §11-101, §11-105, §10-1110, AND §10-
1111, WHEN IT CONCLUDED IN THE ORDER JUDGMENT COULD BE RE-FILED, 
AND THIS INTERPRETATION AND/OR EXPANSION OF THE STATUTES IS 
UNREASONABLE. 
In the Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Relief from Final Judgment the District 
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Court essentially enhanced Idaho Statutes § 11-101, § 11-105, § l 0-1110, and § I 0-1111 with a 
new provision that allows for re-filing a judgment lien after the five year limitation now imposed 
by those statutes. This expansion of the statutes is the basis for the Court's denial of Bonner's 
Motion. (see Order's Conclusion) Without this additional expansion, the statutes allow for relief 
from judgment liens after five years if the judgment lien is not renewed before the end of the five 
year period. And Rule 60(b) gives the Court the authority to grant relief. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BECAUSE THE 
CONTENTS AND SPRIT OF THE ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
FINAL JUDGMENT MAKES IDAHO STATUTES §11-101, §11-105, §10-1110, AND §10-
1111, AMBIGUOUS. 
Prior to the District Court's ruling if a judgment for money or judgment lien was not 
executed or renewed within five years pursuant to Idaho Statutes § 11-101, § 11-105, § 10-1110, 
and § l 0-111 l, or no action was taken on the judgment within six years pursuant to LC. § 5-
215( 1 ), then the judgment would have expired under those statutes. In the January 22, 2013 
Order denying Bonner's motion, the District Court has ruled that the judgment can be re-filed in 
the future, which makes the above cited statutes ambiguous because they are no longer the 
determining fact as to when a judgment expires. 
D. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND AUTHORITY TO 
TOLL A JUDGMENT, WITHOUT ANY BASIS IN LAW, BY RULING THAT THE 
JUDGMENT COULD BE RE-FILED. 
The District Court was in error to toll the judgment by ruling it could be re-filed in the 
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future and to cite the bankruptcy evidence in the Order which was proven false by the Defendant. 
When the District Court ruled in the Order that the judgment could be re-filled, the Court 
fundamentally tolled the judgment without any basis in Idaho law. None of the statutes cited by 
the Court in the Order include a tolling provision. Furthermore, before the Order, the only 
apparent reference to tolling the judgment was set forth as a consequence of bankruptcy in the 
Plaintiffs objection to the Motion for Relief. However, Bonner never filed for bankruptcy and 
proved that fact with an affidavit and by filing a Motion to Hold Attorney William A. McCurdy 
in Contempt of Court for entering false facts. Nonetheless, the District Court referred to the 
Plaintiff's false claim of bankruptcy in the Order and essentially condoned the entry of false 
evidence by an attorney. (Hearing page 2, line 25 to page 3, line 3) 
E. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY NOT CONSIDERING OR APPL YING 
RULE 60(8) WHICH GIVES THE COURT THE ABILITY TO GRANT A MOTION 
FOR RELIEF FROM THE OPERATION OF A JUDGMENT. 
In the Defendant's Motion for Relief from Final Judgment on page 3 Bonner specifically 
cited IRCP Rule 60(b) (4), (5), and (6) as authority for the Court to grant his motion. However, 
in the Order Denying Motion for Relief from Final Judgment the District Court wrote in its 
conclusion on page 4: '"There is nothing in the statutes or rules cited by the Defendant that 
affirmatively grants the Court the ability to grant such a motion for relief from a valid final 
judgment." The Court also cited applicable statutes in the Order; however IRCP Rule 60(b) was 
noticeably absent. 
In the Order's conclusion the Court stated they did not have the ability to grant such a 
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motion for relief from a valid final judgment. However, this judgment had expired pursuant to 
Judge Gutierrez's interpretation of the law in Bach v. Dawson and therefore it was no longer a 
valid judgment. Furthermore, there is no reference in Rule 60(b) to the term "valid" judgment or 
that such a judgment would be exempt from relief under Rule 60(b ). 
As previously stated herein in Allen F Grazer v. Gordon A. Jones, Idaho Courts have 
granted relief fromjudgments because they have expired. 
F. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BECAUSE ITS ACTIONS 
WERE INCONSISTENT. 
The District Court had consistently demonstrated that relief from judgment was proper 
under the law by the Notice of Intent on July 20, 2012 and the Motion Hearing on October 18, 
2012. The District Court issued a Notice of Intent to Grant Motion for Relief from Final 
Judgment on July 20, 2012. In that Notice the Court stated that "Good causing appearing," was 
the basis for granting the Defendant's motion. Between the issuance of this Notice and the Final 
Judgment no true evidence was entered by the Plaintiffs to change this decision. At the motion 
hearing on October 18, 2012 the Court asked Bonner what affirmative action he wanted the 
Court to take. (Motion Hearing page I, line 20-21) By this question, clearly the Court was 
granting Bonner's motion. The Court went on to say that the judgment liens automatically expire 
after five years. (Motion Hearing page 2, line 1-20) However, in the final analysis instead of 
granting the motion and ending the matter, the Court predestined Bonner to return to the legal 
system for relief in the future. (Motion Hearing page 2, line 4-7) Then in sharp contrast the Court 
issued the Order denying Bonner's motion for relief and ruled that the PlaintitPs could re-file the 
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judgment in the future. 
For an unexplained reason the Court changed its position from granting the motion for 
good cause to denying the motion. The Plaintiff's Objection filed August 9, 2012 entered a false 
fact that the Defendant had filed for bankruptcy and that should toll the timeline for seeking 
recovery under the judgment. However, Bonner filed an affidavit proving that he had never filed 
for bankruptcy. And because this was an outright attempt by Plaintiff's Attorney to influence the 
Court's decision with untrue facts, the Defendant filed a motion on Sept. 5, 2012 to hold 
Attorney McCurdy in contempt of court. Bonner withdrew this motion at the hearing on October 
18, 2012 after he believed his motion for relief had been granted. 
Notwithstanding that the bankruptcy fact was proven false, the Court still cited it in the 
Final Decision with a weak disclaimer that the Defendant had disputed it. Since no other facts 
were entered by the Plaintiffs to toll the judgment, on its face it appears that the District Court 
changed its intent to grant Bonner's motion based on the bankruptcy fact, albeit false, and 
subsequently tolled the judgment in the Order denying the Defendant's motion. 
The District Court's final decision on Bonner's motion is inconsistent with the pleadings 
and law in this matter. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, and the transcripts and files of this case, the Defendant Gary 
Lynn Bonner respectfully requests that this Court of Appeals: (1) Reverse the District Court's 
denial of Defendant Bonner's Motion for Relief from Final Judgment, and (2) uphold Idaho 
Statutes that a Judgment cannot be re-filed after it has expired under Idaho Statutes § 11-10 l, 
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§11-105, §10-1110, and §10-1111. 
DATED this l_!tday of June 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this }'/~day of June 2013, I caused to be served 2 copies of a 
true and correct Appellant's Brief and exhibits by U.S. Mail, postpaid, addressed to the 
following: 
William A. McCurdy 
Attorney at Law 
702 W. Idaho St., Ste 1100 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
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